San Francisco and SCADA

Jake Brodsky brought up the following, "Do management and law enforcement types have any clue as to how one might regain control of a SCADA system after a rogue employee has secured everyone out of it?"

I had planned on saying something at the Conference next week but I will bring up now.

There are two aspects of the Terry Childs’ situation, the San Francisco IT Administrator who locked out his Department from the City WAN, that have interesting implications for SCADA/...

We have a problem.  We have efforts at all levels to secure industrial
control systems, but there isn't much coordination.  Some efforts are
falling by the wayside.  The Roadmaps for energy and water are mostly
taking top-down approaches.  There are approaches in the middle such as
the ISA-99, and going further toward the technical side, Secure
Authentication for DNP and the AGA-12 effort.

However, I know of nearly nothing taking place at the bottom.  There are
training courses from DHS aimed a...

It's kind of like Hydrogen Sulfide gas. Yes, everybody knows it stinks. But
did you know that if you stay in it for any length of time that you
don't smell it any more? Security compromises are like that.

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I suspect many of you know me. I'm Jake Brodsky. I write online about
SCADA from the perspective of an asset owner. A lot of people tell me I
write good stuff. Most think I have my hea...