Netherlands ICS Cyberhorror @Hulsebos #SCADA #mfg #pauto #security #manufacuring
Im hijacking Joe's blog for a post of my own.
With a hat tip to Byres Security division of Hirschman/Belden, here's a link to a very good article by Rob Hulsebos, a recognized industrial networking expert who happens to live in The Netherlands.
http://www.tofinosecurity.com/blog/cyber-security-nightmare-netherlands
Some comments.
Rob doesn't clearly define or explain the differences between the exploits he describes using a specific manufacturer's industrial networking gear from the password theft exploits he goes on to cover.
And in the interest of full and complete disclosure, I think it is only fair to note that the host blog is owned by Byres Security, which is in turn owned by a significant European-based competitor to the unfortunate industrial networking gear vendor in Rob's article. I should make clear that I don't think the relationship has anything to do with either Rob's article or his conclusions. The reason I wanted it on the record is to diffuse any attempt by that vendor to accuse Byres Security of doing a "hatchet job on them."
Pay attention, people! Are we going to have to have somebody turn off the air, heat, lights, elevators, escalators, etc. in a large public building with concommittant havoc? Or are we going to need somebody to remotely blow up a refinery? What's it going to take before we start getting real about industrial control security issues?
What's it going to take
"What's it going to take before we start getting real about industrial control security issues?"
I believe the answer is simple. It's going to take regulation, or a major incident. However if we see a major incident it will almost definitely trigger regulation. So the question is if we do the required regulation right away, or if we wait until it is forced by an incident, and put together in the heat, fingerpointing and CYA of what might come.